Posted by Brad @ 1:52 am on November 15th 2007

A Tale of Two Strategies

Adam alluded to it earlier, but I wanted to point the way to a great discussion that’s been protracted at RCP this week, as exemplified in this outstanding post by Jay Cost (Real Clear Politics: 13.5 times the blog we are) .

The discussion is the two competing strategies between who I would deem the two Republican frontrunners—by virtue of them being the two who are dominante in the two competing standard (and proven) electoral strategies—Mitt Romney and Rudy Giuliani. Rudy is about as competitive as anybody, which is to say about as competitive as everybody, in Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina combined. Mitt, on the other hand, is fourth place nationally among Republicans, still polling in the single digits in many national surveys, but nevertheless maintaining a strong lead in a plurality of early states, including being way out in front in Iowa and New Hampshire, the Park Place and Boardwalk of primary races. Rudy’s argument, in a nutshell, is who cares about that? Rudy’s been the frontrunner since before the race began, he’s still the frontrunner, nobody else comes close, and Romney could win every single one of the first 6 contests and Rudy could still have the nomination all but wrapped up by February 6th. Press is nice, but it’s delegates that win nominations. Romney’s argument is: we’ll see how strong that national lead is when your “Win Nothing” gamble gets put into motion. After 6 states go by with hardly a word about you save how little you’re doing, voters across the nation won’t be able to help going looking at the proven winner.

The question is this: traditionally, the early state strategy has been a good one, but much much harder to yoke in your favor, intentionally, than a strong “I’m the best known and most liked candidate in the party” campaign. It’s almost ALWAYS the case that somebody comes in with a sudden surprising surge in an early state, and for a little while that’s all anybody can talk about. That’s not even a somewhat common “upset”—it’s wrong to talk about the frontrunner not winning either Iowa or New Hampshire as being a surprise—it is, by and large, a norm. Of course, what happens from that point on is another matter entirely, and while it may SEEM like these upsets create exciting races that could turn at any moment, in truth it usually just fills column space, gives political geeks something to go nutty about, and then the guy that was probably going to win all along goes on to easily win anyway, without ever really being threatened in the sense that he’s never really at the point of running even with the upstart in delegates, states, money, or gross votes. Think Edwards in 2004 or McCain in 2000 or Forbes in 1996 or…on and on. The air getting sucked out of the frontrunner? Yes. Exciting races? Okay.

Close ones?

Well, no, not really.

Still, a candidate that doesn’t win Iowa or New Hampshire, has a very, very long shot at winning the nomination. The reason is because, from the day of the Iowa caucuses on, America becomes electoral–race crazy for a brief time. It’s almost as if a plurality of voters have never heard of anybody, and just pick up a newspaper the day after Iowa and scan the top three, judging them to be anybody who’s anybody. So, there’s something to be said for the Romney strategy.

But, a few things work against him, and I’m not breaking new ground by pointing out that the compressed calendar is the main one. Three weeks of being on top is pretty good. One isn’t bad either. Two days, before your story gets knocked off the front page? That’s not even a news cycle.

What’s more, as Cost astutely points out, Romney’s strategy is fundamentally more difficult to pull off than Rudy’s.

I suppose that my only point on the viability of these strategies is that Romney’s might be harder to execute. For Romney to develop the momentum that he needs to take Giuliani down on February 5 – he will have to have decisive wins in several of the early contests. This could be problematic. Huckabee is on the rise in Iowa – and a strong second might lessen the luster of Romney’s win (and, of course, Romney would be in huge trouble if Huckabee bests him). Giuliani and McCain are currently both stuck in second place in New Hampshire, but both are within striking distance. Again, a Romney loss in New Hampshire (especially to Giuliani) would be a big problem for him. And South Carolina is a dead heat between Giuliani and Romney – with Thompson not far behind in third.

I’ll add, of course, Ron Paul in New Hampshire, and if Huckabee does come on with a close second or even a win in Iowa, as I expect him to, we’ll see how well Romney does in South Carolina. Or, if one candidate wins Iowa, one wins New Hampshire, and say Thompson takes it in South Carolina, that’s great for all three, but not enough to push any to the top, and Rudy keeps tucking away delegates as the press gets whiplash. If Romney wins all three, maybe. But how likely is Romney to win all three?

What’s more, the expectations game is killer here. Rudy can lose all the states, and still be considered the frontrunner. If Romney loses Iowa to Huckabee, or New Hamsphire to Rudy, or South Carolina to Thompson, the story is “OMG CHECK OUT THIS CANDIDATE THAT JUST PUT MITT AWAY?! CAN ROMNEY POSSIBLY SURVIVE?!?!” To put that another way, Rudy’s ploy is that other candidates can get positive attention out of early wins, but it still won’t get Rudy negative attention. Romney’s ploy is all about positive attention to himself. But the downside is, any lack of it is automatic negative. I’ve got to side with Rudy on this one. I concur with Richelieu:

Act shocked and amazed when Rudy soars over all expectations to a stunning and amazing third place finish in Iowa with 17 percent of the vote (or even get lucky and hit second place), while Mitt Romney “loses” Iowa by only winning with 38 percent to Mike Huckabee’s stunning 32 percent. Then ride that “upset” bounce (the bounce you officially don’t believe in) into New Hampshire on breathless press coverage and win another huge and amazing upset, beating a wounded Romney and McCain, among the most pro-choice and moderate-friendly GOP primary states. Run the table thereafter to win the nomination, clinching it on February 5.

But here’s what we don’t talk about, when people pundit on this question. That is: Mitt Romney is just not a very strong candidate at this point, and his room to grow isn’t very large.

A few points there.

Romney has essentially given up his “America’s CEO” campaign hook, which could have been very strong. But to employ it would mean running unabashedly on his previous record. And as every conservative commentator is gleeful to point out, that’s a pretty liberal—not bad, but liberal—record. One only has to see the fear in Romney’s eyes about being painted a liberal to see how he pretty much CAN’T run on his record, or doesn’t feel he can. So, he’s barely tried.

Instead, his key has almost been the OPPOSITE of what would make sense. A competent executive, not particularly a party booster (play as: independent-minded, real leader, electable, whatever), with a record of constantly making both liberal and conservative overtures to appeal to a broad range of people—oh yeah, he’s a Mormon to boot: he’s trying to run as the religious right candidate. Romney is not, on the face of it, a bad candidate. He’d have a great narrative for a general election. But he’s chasing such a counter-intuitive dragon that there is extreme tension in his every utterance. Every narrative he’s generated in this race is a negative one. And, the people he’s desperately depending on to fall in line behind him aren’t buying it. So he refuses to run as the broad-appeal CEO, and he’s not succeeding as the born-again religious right evangelical—what’s the case again for President Romney that’s going to knock over Republican voters, if only they get a chance to hear it? Honest question, because I still haven’t been able to make heads or tails of it.

What’s more, when the “Early State Surpriser” strategy DOES work, it tends to be somebody who hasn’t gotten a real look from voters before, and who, upon that look, comes off as…well, somebody maybe worth looking at. I’d put Mike Huckabee in that category. But Romney doesn’t suffer from low name ID at this point. He’s been a Republican frontrunner from the very beginning. Is he as well known or well–generically–loved as Rudy Giulliani? No, but he’s certainly not somebody that voters just haven’t had a chance with (I’d put McCain in this category also). He’s already spent more on campaign advertising than most of the other candidates combined. It’s not like he’s not getting press, or he’s not “out there” yet and all he needs is attention. He’s had the attention…and again, he’s running fourth. It would be one thing if he were well known and close, another if he were distant but new. Romney’s neither, and both (the formers). Worst of two worlds.

All of this is me saying I side with Rudy on this one. I don’t necessarily think that Rudy has the nomination sewn up, by any means—there are just too many x-factors in this Republican race to say that. But if it’s a competition between Mitt Romney running his game, and Rudy Giuliani running his, Rudy wins, 9 times out of 10. What’s more, Rudy’s game runs him to at least a strong second, no matter what happens. Romney’s could run him to being out in a few weeks.

Buy, buy, buy.

2 Comments »

  1. I think you’re right about Romney–although there’s been some substantial, inexplicable movement in his direction in the Rasmussen numbers over the last week.

    Where I think your analysis falls apart is the assumption that Giuliani becomes the default choice in Romney’s absence.

    Giuliani is NOT the second choice of Romney supporters, nor of anyone else. People have made up their minds about Giuliani at this point, and he’s locked into a support number that vacillates between 21 and 28 points among likely voters. That number is solid enough in a six-way race. But when Romney goes down–and I agree that he will–the beneficiaries will likely be McCain and Huckabee, not Giuliani.

    And if Giuliani winds up in a three-cornered race against those two, he’s in trouble. They’re both more “right” on core Republican issues than Giuliani is, and they’re at least as good as he is in front of a crowd.

    Giuliani’s best hope is the same as Hillary’s–he has to hope that the rest of the field does just enough to stay viable, and keep splitting the anti-Giuliani vote until he’s the inevitable nominee. I can see that scenario on the Dem side, but not among the Republicans. The war chests are too small and the strategies too front-loaded.

    Comment by Rojas — 11/15/2007 @ 10:45 am

  2. I wrote a bit about this issue before. What I said then, regarding the Romney and Edwards front-loaded strategy versus the national strategy was:

    My guesstimate is that New Hampshire and Iowa will allow Romney and Edwards to keep campaigning into the voting season but that their camps are perhaps too focussed on those votes. My original cattle-call predictions (Edwards and McCain) are looking pretty bad now, for different reasons; I think that Edwards is too focussed on early states when the national opinion is more important than has been the case in the past and McCain, who has a big national profile, is getting hurt (more by immigration than Iraq, amongst Republican voters). My model is that the national polls amongst people who are eligible or likely to vote in the primaries, the polls that tend to garner the most attention, really are, this year, more important relative to the early state polls (unless New Hampshire and Iowa move way forward). Strength in early states will keep candidates in the game, but not build enough support in the big votes shortly afterward.

    That’s still my opinion, pretty much.

    Comment by Adam — 11/15/2007 @ 11:23 am

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