It’s a fundamental question, and one that I don’t think a lot of people have a good answer for. What exactly is the goal of our surge? What are we holding out for? What are we trying to prevent, and more to the point, how do we actually prevent it, rather than just sitting on it?
Biden last night made a good point that the War in Iraq, as talked about 99% of the time, is an exercise of completely talking over the issue. It’s a false choice, that we’re going to “win” or “lose” and that our options are to either stay (presumably indefinitely; I guess the notion is “until Iraq is a stable functioning democracy aligned with US interests that can take charge of its own security”, but I’m coming to think more and more that even that conceptualization is all in how you define the goalposts, and is becoming a little like the goalposts of the “war on terror”, in that when you strip back the rhetoric, there really are none, or at least none in any meaningful sense of it), or to leave right now and throw Iraq entirely under the bus (absolutely none of the Democratic plans save maybe Mike Gravel’s offers this alternative–almost all are measured, pretty reasonable views of keeping a lid on things as best we can without permanently stationing half our military there).
This is sort of a continuation of Adam’s post below, but the terms of the debate, and even the reality (or unreality) of our goals in Iraq belie a certain vapidity at this point that I think is a lot more important than we give credit to. There are a fair few people who have no idea how a continuation of present policy might render a positive solution (“win”) in Iraq, or even have any real notion of what a positive solution would entail, or even look like, and yet who support it anyway just because of the sense that “we owe it to them” or “it’s too important to not do”. I guess the notion is that if we just hang around long enough, maybe something will spontaneously generate under our noses. We don’t even know what that thing might be, but maybe it’ll be good, and the only way that might possibly happen is if we stay in a holding pattern until it happens (that corollary, of course, is when do we decide that it isn’t going to happen, with no timetables or yardsticks or units of measure or even, well, goals, beyond faint, undefined “hopes”)? If you can’t define success, you can’t really define failure either. And so you just sit around, hoping for one or the other to define itself for you, which of course it never well, and try desperately to herd the rhetorical cats into this or that paradigm so you can win or lose the day’s news cycle, and repeat next week. Such has been our Iraq policy since about six months after the military intervention there.
The more I think about this, the more I have no idea what pro-war advocates or the present military and political leadership of America’s role in Iraq are even proposing we wait for, or what THEY think they’re waiting for. What most recently spurred this line of thinking, in addition to last night’s debates, is this meandering but sharply honest opine from Josh Marshall. For the last few years, whenever I hear almost anybody talk about Iraq, it all coalesces into this vague rhetorical space in my head that seems more and more meaningless the longer it goes on, while the reality on the ground seems to be almost exactly the same now as it was two years ago. We can’t win OR lose Iraq, at this point, because we don’t have any objectives or measurements whatsoever. When you don’t even have a goal, how can you succeed, or fail?
Maybe it would be helpful if every candidate or even advocate, for or against (thought for or against what, I have no idea), were required to answer these three questions (there are surely better ways to phrase it and more questions to ask, but off the top of my head):
1. What, specifically, would success in Iraq look like? What positive outcome would allow us the luxury of withdrawing?
2. What, specifically, would failure in Iraq look like? What negative outcome would finally require us to declare our presence there as no longer being meaningfully helpful, or being more hurtful than it is helpful?
3. What responsibility does America have, if any, to setting conditions for its presence in Iraq, and what might those conditions be?